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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

21 August 1951

Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence

Subject: Probable Soviet Objectives and Tactics in the  
Forthcoming San Francisco Peace Conference

Soviet acceptance of the invitation to attend the US-UK sponsored Japanese peace treaty conference at San Francisco follows extended efforts by the USSR to prevent the conclusion of a peace treaty on the basis of US-UK proposals. The USSR may have given up hope of blocking the signature of the US-UK draft and may be attending the conference merely to register its objections for the record and to continue its propaganda attack on the US-UK treaty.

We believe it more likely, however, that the USSR, in attempting to forestall signature of the US-UK draft, will adopt a positive approach and introduce as an alternative a general program for peace in the Far East. To create a favorable atmosphere for the Soviet approach, the USSR may engineer a cease fire agreement in Korea. A proposal for widening the scope of the San Francisco conference would be designed to appeal not only to Japan and other Far Eastern nations, but also to Western European nations that have misgivings with respect to US Far Eastern policy.

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Regardless of the outcome of any Soviet proposals, the USSR will almost certainly not sign the US-UK draft and will probably attempt to influence Far Eastern nations not to sign, by threats and intimidation if necessary. We consider it unlikely, however, that the USSR would go so far as to issue an ultimatum to signatories of the US-UK draft, nor do we believe that the USSR will react to the signing of the US-UK draft by an attack on Japan. Rather, on the basis of its position at San Francisco, the USSR would probably seek to develop popular reaction against the "separate" treaty in Japan, elsewhere in the Far East, and Western Europe, hoping thereby to prevent the ratification of the treaty or, at least, to limit the number of countries ratifying.

We believe that the Soviet tactic at the conference will be to open with a strong attack against the US-UK draft. The USSR will probably claim that the draft is "illegal" because previous international agreements were violated and Communist China was not consulted. They will also contend that the draft treaty is not truly a treaty of "peace" because it is part of a US plan to militarize Japan and to convert it into an American colony for aggressive purposes. In addition, the USSR will probably repeat Communist propaganda that the US-UK draft does not do justice either to Japan or to other Asiatic states.

Having delivered its criticism and vilification of the US-UK draft, the USSR may present an alternative draft peace treaty embodying a general program for peace in the Far East. The Soviet delegation will probably insist that this draft be considered by "all states that participated with their armed forces in the war against Japan" (specifically including Communist China and possibly Outer Mongolia and North Korea). The USSR may indicate a willingness to discuss, either at

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San Francisco or at a later conference, any outstanding Far Eastern issues not resolved by their draft of the Japanese Peace Treaty. The USSR might in this way hope to widen the scope of the San Francisco discussions and exploit differences between the US and its allies on the recognition of Communist China and the disposition of Taiwan.

Although the USSR will probably present its program as a "fresh" approach to the Japanese problem, it will undoubtedly include specific points already advanced in official and unofficial Soviet statements.

These will probably include the following:

- (1) Communist China must be included among the negotiating powers.
- (2) The treaty should merely ratify agreements reached at Cairo, Yalta and Potsdam. These would have the effect of confirming Soviet possession of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin and giving Communist China possession of Formosa and the Pescadores.
- (3) The Ryukyus, Bonins, and other small island groups should be returned to Japan or their disposal left to the UN Security Council.
- (4) While Japan should pay reparations, Japan should be given full opportunities for trade with the Asian mainland, as well as assistance in unlimited development of "peaceful" industry, and possibly an extension of Japanese fishing rights.

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- (5) All foreign troops should be withdrawn from Japan within a year, Japanese rearmament to be limited and subject to inspection, no power to be permitted to maintain military bases in Japan, and Japan not to be permitted to make bilateral security agreements.

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